That is true. But then, observers can contrast on what is said vs what they know.
Iran have yet to fatigue Israeli air defense.
The real fatigue is when there are human casualties and other damages on the ground. Why else would you want to intercept weapons BEFORE they land? Why else, back in Desert Storm, did the F-15 guys cleared Iraqi sky so our F-16s can do our jobs, which was to create real fatigue for the Iraqi Army?
A %90 interception rate is unprecedented and you have to give credits to the Israelis for that. Even %60 would be hailed as exceptional.
A %90 interception rate is morale boosting, especially among civilians because the firefighters and other emergency workers can focus on something else other than pulling out bodies from rubble.
A %90 interception rate allows crew rotations.
Then, if munition runs low, a %90 interception rate allows better prioritization of defensible areas and husbandry of whatever munition left.
We learned all this all the way back to WW II. Where have you guys been?
I do. I know some pretty smart fellers out at Nellis.
And are you saying that there are real experts in this discussion?
I see this more like how US FIM-92 stingers were used against USSR aerial targets to devastating effect. A small, man-portable, cheap shoulder fired missile to take out a more expensive and capable machinery. I think Iran has taken a page or two out of that and seems to have build strategic forces around it and then some more....a lot more.
The issue here is that this attack a single incident and probably a one-off. To truly understand what is likely to happen is the see the Ukraine-Russia war where fatigue has definitely set in along with a sense of defeat that the war is unwinnable. All of that on the back of drones and missiles (with artillery keeping its presence known).
Here is how I see the attack:
1- Technical interception and actual interception has proven to be closely aligned but the system seems to have been under stress (hence the reason it is not a 100%)
2- Other supporting factors i.e. airforces from other countries who had enough missiles to take action. This definitely aided Israel though I would argue it was a more decisive component in tackling the attack from Iran. Had this been absent, I am confident, mathematically speaking, the 90% interception success rate would have dwindled to a less than ideal number.
3- As seen in Ukraine, the need to use expensive operations and anti-missile components against far cheaper attack weapons and very simple and slow weapons is an interesting take. I think learnings from this is that you need a sort of point defence system to take out such cheap weapons to be economically feasible.
Now, Israel plans to respond but I am strongly wondering, if the following questions are being asked and answered:
1. How many drones and missiles can the air defence (air planes and ground defences) can take out before the interception rate drastically falls? Does Iran know about that?
2. What options are there to make air defence feasible i.e. determining whether a likely target of the weapon system is worth saving against more high value targets? What is the calculation with respect to what is deemed a high cost to air defence?
3. What is the capacity and capability of air defence in the absence of advance warnings and little time to prepare?
4. What does a multiple sets of attacks look like where the missiles are 1000+, across a range of waves, across different vectors, and with much more lethality and capability?
I am a simple man, but I believe the questions above dont make a strong case to retaliate against Iran and so it should be that Israel should just take the win. The truth is, from this attack and from the Ukraine war, we have entered an era where the drone is most likely the kind of air warfare and a decisive factor. The high cost weapon systems touted for their precision is beginning to look like a negative versus low cost attack platforms that are likely to severely challenge the defender.
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