What do you think AZM and PFX were trying to accomplish? And what's the outcome of PFX-Alpha and later a 5th gen platform? These are based on JF-17 buddy.....
Now if I were to do it, I'd go the J-10C route and create a stealthy canard smaller brother of J-20. That seems economical, industry gets matured and we get top end capability both for 4.5 gen J-10C and 5th gen future version.
The idea of creating a stealthier version of the JF-17 or even the J-10C often gets thrown around without a proper understanding of what that really entails both technically and financially. You’re drawing a loose comparison to efforts like the F-15 Silent Eagle or the later Su-35 variants, which do feature some reductions in radar cross-section (RCS), but you’re missing the full picture. This isn’t just a matter of reshaping a few panels and slapping on RAM (radar-absorbing material).
RCS reduction is not linear, nor is it plug-and-play.
RCS reduction is a systems-level design philosophy. You cannot just reduce the aircraft’s frontal profile or add coatings and expect dramatic results. That is why true stealth platforms like the F-22 or B-2 are built from the ground up around low observability. Every inlet, edge alignment, internal bay design, engine nozzle shape, and surface treatment is optimized for signature suppression. In contrast, legacy airframes like the JF-17 or J-10C have not been designed this way. Their internal geometry, external hardpoints, and aerodynamic shaping are not conducive to VLO (very low observability) optimization.
Even in Western programs, partial stealth upgrades have limitations. Take the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, for example. Boeing put significant effort into reducing its frontal RCS compared to the older Hornet. But the moment you hang external fuel tanks, targeting pods, or air-to-air missiles under the wings, the benefit drops sharply. External stores become dominant RCS contributors. This is why aircraft like the F-35 carry weapons internally. Without internal bays, stealth becomes highly conditional.
The KF-21 Boramae is a textbook example of this intermediate approach. It is a reduced RCS platform, not a stealth platform. It features some shaping elements for frontal RCS control and RAM treatment, but it lacks internal bays and has conventional engine exhausts. It is designed to lower detectability in certain scenarios, not disappear from the battlespace. And even this program, backed by South Korean defense industry and Lockheed Martin tech transfer, costs billions.
Now apply that to PAC and it is even more difficult because there is no evidence it has the capacity to design and integrate a true stealth upgrade to an existing platform. Even modest RCS reduction would require re-engineering the airframe, redesigning intakes, modifying avionics architecture, integrating RAM coatings with sustainable lifecycle support, and re-certifying aerodynamic performance.
Pakistan does not have the industrial base, testing infrastructure, or software ecosystems to pull this off alone. Stealth is not just about shaping metal. It involves computational fluid dynamics, electromagnetic signature modeling, advanced materials science, radar signature testing, and long-term maintenance planning. All of these are expensive and require sustained investment.
The why is important too.
A stealthified JF-17 would cost significantly more without delivering near-peer survivability. You end up spending resources on partial improvements without reaching the threshold where it changes the operational equation. It’s the classic case of diminishing returns. For a country that relies on budget flexibility, donor funds, and subsidized imports, this is not the kind of project that returns strategic value.
