China Wants a Big Fleet of 5 Aircraft Carriers by 2030

[UKBengali]

Are people simply forgetting that as China grows into a military superpower in the 2030s then it will start building bases in friendly countries like Pakistan?

China's current geographical vulnerability will be sorted in time as it reclaims Taiwan and starts building naval bases in friendly countries in Asia and Africa.

 

[DF-41]

But has more than enough missiles to hit every military bases in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.

And in addition to missiles, China got even more cruise missiles for Taiwan and South Korea and Japan AND ALL American AIR AND NAVAL BASES THERE AND DIEGO GARCIA TO CONTINUE WHAT THE MISSILES DESTROYED

 

[Han Patriot]

USN has a history of operating it

America also went to the moon 50 years ago. Look at the current upside down NASA funded mission. Sure experience can help but people get old and ships do retire.

 

[DF-41]

And in addition to missiles, China got even more cruise missiles for Taiwan and South Korea and Japan AND ALL American AIR AND NAVAL BASES THERE AND DIEGO GARCIA TO CONTINUE WHAT THE MISSILES DESTROYED

Folks here dont need to take my word.

Read this.

Considering this was written in 2009, and the missiles China got since then probably 4 to 5 times more, and even more powerful BANGS as well.

Fighting Under Missile Attack | Air & Space Forces Magazine

The Air Force hasn’t thought about air base defense for a while. Now, things are changing.

www.airandspaceforces.com

Fighting Under Missile Attack​

By John Stillion
Aug. 1, 2009
For the first time in decades, Air Force aircraft deployed in an international crisis now face substantial risk of damage or destruction on the ground. By some estimates, missile and air attacks could disable up to 70 percent of the aircraft at some overseas bases in the opening minutes of a fight.
The problem is not insurmountable; the Air Force and the Pentagon already have the means to start addressing this critical problem. Even so, there is no doubt the threat is growing.

The affordability, accuracy, and ease of operation of today’s cruise and ballistic missiles make possible an effective surprise attack on theater air bases. Some of the more obvious countermeasures, such as operating from more-distant bases, raise major questions about the ability of current and planned USAF forces to fight an effective and efficient air campaign.

China’s Dongfeng 15 (CSS-6) ballistic missile during a test launch. (Photo via sinodefence.com)

These difficulties are compounded in areas such as the Western Pacific, where the missile and air threat is large, bases are few, and political access to existing facilities often is limited or greatly constrained.
The full magnitude of this challenge can be glimpsed by examining a single, highly realistic scenario—emergency movement of US military forces to the Far East in response to a brewing China-Taiwan confrontation in the year 2015.

In this scenario, one of the main difficulties facing the Air Force would be the shortage of suitable bases in the Western Pacific. Only four of the eight US bases there have hardened aircraft shelters.
Already, three of those four (Osan Air Base and Kunsan Air Base in South Korea and Kadena Air Base in Japan) are well within reach of hundreds of Chinese People’s Liberation Army missiles. Currently, China has fielded about 400 conventional ballistic missiles and 250 cruise missiles that could reach bases in Japan and South Korea. Beijing also boasts a large fleet of advanced fighter-bombers.
The fourth hardened base (Misawa AB, Japan) lies just outside this threat ring. However, that puts Misawa about 1,850 miles from the Taiwan Strait, roughly the same distance from the strait as Andersen AFB, Guam, far to the south.
The US currently operates from only two bases—both on Okinawa—that lie within 500 miles of the strait. Requirements of tanking, sortie rates, and infrastructure availability make Kadena the best theater base for a large fighter contingent.
A typical US crisis response would likely see Kadena receiving a mix of aircraft similar to what was sent to Aviano AB, Italy, for Operation Allied Force in 1999, or to Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain, for Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

In a crisis, one could find roughly 190 aircraft on the ground at Kadena. Virtually all of these would be parked in the open, as Kadena has only 15 hardened aircraft shelters.
The shelter shortage could be a critical vulnerability if Kadena ever came under attack from a sophisticated enemy—such as China—which has large numbers of advanced, long-range weapons ready at hand.
Consider a Kadena scenario, built around the following realistic assumptions:

• The attacking force finds two categories of targets: (1) stationary aircraft parked in the open, and (2) aircraft that have some measure of protection because they are airborne, taxiing for takeoff, or cocooned in hardened shelters.
• Of the total, nonsheltered parking space, 90 percent is covered by a massive missile attack. No parked aircraft has time to take off. Of this unprotected aircraft force, 75 percent is destroyed. All others are severely damaged.
• Taxiing aircraft escape without damage. Also undamaged, of course, are aircraft that are already airborne.
• Aircraft ensconced in hardened shelters ride out the attack undamaged. However, these bunkered aircraft are stuck on the ground due to massive debris on operating surfaces and more than 2,500 unexploded submunitions. They are targeted in follow-on attacks by cruise missiles.

A US Patriot missile is fired from a mobile launcher. (US Army photo)

Substantial Losses
Losses would be substantial. According to our calculation, only 82 of 268 aircraft deployed to Kadena—31 percent—would be available for postattack operations. These surviving aircraft are assumed to land at other airfields in Japan where specialized parts, maintenance personnel, weapons, etc., are unlikely to be available—further reducing their immediate combat capability.
The threat comes from the PLA 2nd Artillery Corps, which operates China’s land-based strategic missile force—in practice a fourth service co-equal with the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The 2nd Artillery modernization has special significance for US air and naval forces. As a “missile-centric” service, 2nd Artillery has created the world’s first large, accurate, conventional missile bombardment capability.
The latest DOD report on Chinese military capability observes that, if recent trends continue, the 2nd Artillery by 2015 will have about 500 CSS-6 ballistic and 800 DH-10 cruise missiles capable of reaching airfields in Korea, Japan, or the Philippines.
The speed and accuracy of these systems, combined with the difficulty of defending against them, make the missiles ideal for carrying out rapid, accurate, and intense surprise attacks.
This missile capability is qualitatively different from anything US forces have faced in the past. The Chinese ballistic missiles of greatest significance to US forces operating in the Western Pacific are the CSS-5 and CSS-6. Both are launched from mobile vehicles, have advanced guidance systems, and solid propellant motors. They have longer range, greater ease of operation, and higher reliability than previous-generation missiles such as the liquid-fueled V-2 and Scud.
The CSS-5 and CSS-6 also are accurate and have a range of warhead options that make them more flexible and destructive than earlier missiles. The CSS-6 and similar Russian systems are for sale on the world market.
The attack scenario above assumes each CSS-6 warhead contains 750 1.1-pound bomblets similar to the M74 bomblet carried by the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).
The bomblets also are dispensed in a manner similar to the ATACMS dispensing sequence, with an assumed average pattern density of one bomblet every 51 feet. This gives each warhead an effective lethal radius against soft targets (such as aircraft parked in the open) of approximately 650 feet.

SrA. Casey Bennett (foreground) and A1C Jacob Sprick guard a US Army Patriot missile air defense artillery battery near Osan AB, South Korea. (Photo by Jim Haseltine)

Warding off this kind of threat would be difficult. The key would be dispersal. China could theoretically saturate the entire airfield at Kadena with only 34 warheads. That would hit everything found on Kadena’s parking ramps.
Pentagon officials believe the PLA has about 100 launchers for CSS-6 missiles, so a highly scripted, well-rehearsed surprise attack like this would require fewer than half the available mobile missile launchers. China would still have plenty more for attacks on other targets.
Current Chinese conventional ballistic missiles cannot quite reach Andersen on Guam. However, improved missiles having this capability will likely enter service over the next decade. Assuming aircraft deployed to Andersen during a crisis would be similar to those deployed to European bases and Diego Garcia during Desert Storm, an attack with as few as 17 missiles could produce devastating results.
For more than a decade, PLA planners have assumed that Washington would intervene in any future conflict between Taiwan and China. This assumption is buttressed by the US response to incidents such as the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis, the 2001 EP-3 collision and internment, and the October 2006 surfacing of a PLA Navy submarine near a US aircraft carrier.
Chinese strategists believe a conflict over Taiwan independence would be a “local war” where neither the US nor China would seek to destroy its opponent. The focus would instead end with the political status of Taiwan and the post-conflict political-military situation in the Western Pacific.
Chinese strategists also recognize that it will be decades before the PLA could take on the US in a traditional force-on-force battle and expect to win. Therefore, they focus on strategic principles that would allow China to prevail in a limited conflict with a “technologically superior enemy”—the United States. These principles include:

F-16s of the 80th Fighter Squadron taxi down the runway at Kunsan AB, South Korea. Kunsan is well within the range of Chinese ballistic missiles. (USAF photo by SSgt. Araceli Alarcon)

• Seizing the initiative early in the conflict.
• Achieving surprise by striking at unexpected times and places and/or when the enemy is unprepared.
• Attacking pre-emptively to achieve maximum surprise, psychological shock, disrupt deployments, and increase chances of gaining the initiative.

Chinese planners say initial attacks should feature “key point strikes” against information systems, command centers, key weapon systems, support systems, and bases. These should be conducted with a goal to “paralyze first, annihilate later.”
Initial attacks should be conducted by the best available forces and concentrated in space and time “against targets vital to sustaining and supporting the enemy’s operational system.”
The strategists also seek to raise enemy costs by causing significant military casualties early and “smashing the enemy’s will to resist.”
The PLA has had about a decade to develop operational concepts, acquire systems, and train forces based on these principles. The ballistic missile forces of the 2nd Artillery Corps are especially well-suited for implementing these principles.
The problem isn’t just the missiles. US planners seeking to ensure the availability of air bases overseas must consider that ballistic missile attacks are likely to be combined with (or serve as precursors to) additional attacks by cruise missiles and fixed wing aircraft. Other nations, such as Russia and Iran, have or are working to acquire similar capabilities.
Fortunately, US airpower bases are not mere sitting ducks. Far from it. There are several prudent steps that can be taken or already have been taken to minimize the threat.
Defenses
One response, already implemented, is the deployment of a Patriot anti-missile battalion to Okinawa. With PAC-3 missiles, the latest Patriot systems are much more capable than those deployed during Desert Storm.
However, when presented with dozens of fast, maneuvering CSS-6 re-entry vehicles simultaneously, even the PAC-3 system will likely intercept only a few incoming missiles.
It is probable that any surprise attack would seek to overwhelm the Patriot and also include some missiles aimed at Patriot radar and control systems—to help ensure subsequent missile or aircraft attacks face minimal defenses.
Even if active defenses such as Patriot become much more effective, the large footprint of each “leaking” warhead (well over one million square feet can be covered by dispersed bomblets) means that aircraft must be kept outside missile range, parked inside a shelter, or face a significant risk of destruction on the ground.
Over the short term, USAF will need to use existing systems and facilities in creative ways to negate the growing threat posed by accurate, proliferating missiles.

Two F-22 Raptors move down the ramp at Kadena AB, Japan, in preparation for a mission in the Pacific region. In the background are two F-15s. (USAF photo by MSgt. Andy Dunaway)

One obvious response is to disperse combat and support aircraft across a larger number of bases—preferably outside the reach of the majority of PLA systems. There are, for example, numerous airfields on the eastern periphery of the Philippine Sea that could be used by USAF aircraft over the short term. The inherent drawback is that safety comes from being outside of Chinese missile range, but this would simultaneously put aircraft farther from the action.
Iwo To (Iwo Jima) is already inside the reach of CSS-5 missiles and therefore is not a good choice as a major deployment base.
Wake Island lies nearly 3,000 miles east of the Taiwan Strait (approximately the distance from Diego Garcia to Baghdad). It is best suited to be a bomber base.
Andersen has long runways and ample parking and fuel storage areas, but is completely unhardened. Washington might be tempted to concentrate a large number of aircraft at Andersen. That would go completely against the logic of dispersal.
Fortunately, there are additional options, in the Mariana Islands. The civil airport on Guam (Won Pat Airport), along with Tinian and Saipan, could host reasonable numbers of fighters and support aircraft.
The remaining three airfields—in the Marianas, Micronesia, and Palau—all offer runways shorter than 7,200 feet, have limited parking space and other infrastructure, and could at best support modest numbers of aircraft. There is also the political issue of gaining permission to use airfields outside US territory.
Dispersal comes with an operational cost. With fighter and attack bases about 1,600 miles from the Taiwan Strait, sortie rates (and thus combat power) would be reduced by 40 percent or more compared to operations from Kadena.
Meanwhile, tanker support requirements would increase enormously—with about three tankers required to support every five fighters deployed. To fly the same number of combat sorties per day as if from Kadena, the US would need to deploy about 100 additional combat aircraft and 200 additional tankers.
Beyond 2020
In the medium term (2015-20), USAF could benefit by making improvements to the airfield infrastructure on the eastern periphery of the Philippine Sea. Extending runways and parking ramps, enhancing fuel storage, and beginning to harden all critical systems would clearly improve the ability of this set of bases to support combat operations under fire.
In the years beyond 2020, more will be required—it is likely that China by then will possess a significant number of missiles with the range to attack unprotected aircraft operating from the periphery of the Philippine Sea. USAF will need to be able to shelter large numbers of aircraft from missile attack and conduct significant rapid runway repair and air base damage repair.
Given the distances involved and limited basing options, it will also be necessary to protect not just fighters, but large support aircraft (tankers, AWACS, Global Hawk, etc.) as well.

A U-boat takes shelter under a bunker at Lorient, France, in World War II. A hardened aircraft shelter of similar size would cost $700 million, but could protect 12 large aircraft or 36 fighters.

Fighter-size shelters have existed for decades: Cold War-era NATO fighter shelters were three- to six-feet thick and could protect aircraft against submunition attack but not direct hits by penetrating missile warheads.
The accuracy of modern ballistic and cruise missiles would allow an adversary to put two or three missiles on each shelter with high confidence of achieving a hit. With shelters, instead of killing multiple aircraft with each missile, future enemies may have to settle for killing one front-line aircraft with two or three $10 million missiles. It is still a good trade.
Shelters with nine-foot-thick walls and 12-foot-thick roofs constructed of high-strength concrete would be required to defeat ballistic and cruise missiles armed with penetrating warheads. This was done during World War II to protect German U-boats. So shelters suitable for protecting any USAF aircraft could be built, but as always, would come at a price.
Officials estimate the cost of a large, 12-bay shelter at $700 million. This is expensive, but obviously not as expensive as failing to deter a war with China or permanently losing a large portion of USAF combat capability in a surprise attack. Such a shelter could hold wide-bodied aircraft and could protect $10 billion worth of USAF assets from attack.
If the Air Force can protect its aircraft, then an opponent such as the PLA can expect much less benefit from a quick strike. By targeting runways and taxiways, an adversary may be able to disrupt or temporarily halt sorties from a given base. When the attacking missiles run out, the Air Force could repair its bases and bring its full combat power to bear with little or no interference.
The key to success is protecting combat and support aircraft until an opponent’s missile inventory is exhausted. Having more long-range bombers wouldn’t hurt, either.
The Air Force has taken some initial steps toward beefing up its long-range combat capability in the region. International training exercises and bare-bones “lily pad” deployments have become common.
The Air Force may need to fight from a small number of “bunker spaces” in a future Western Pacific war, but steps taken even today to provide access through improved range, dispersal, and hardening can ease the strain.
John Stillion was an Air Force officer from 1984 to 1992 and over the past 15 years has published multiple analytic reports on airpower topics. He currently lives in Virginia and is an adjunct professor at the University of Richmond. This is his first article for Air Force Magazine.

 

[F-22Raptor]

Guam’s Airspace Set To Be Most Defended On Earth In New Plans​

Guam is set to gain as many as 20 new air defense sites packed with surface-to-air interceptors, radars, and more as part of a massive defensive upgrade plan. Overall, the island looks set to become the most densely protected place anywhere on the planet.

Documents the U.S. military has released discussing the potential impacts on day-to-day life on Guam from the new air and missile defenses have offered a new look at the scale and scope of the project. A total of 20 separate sites are currently under consideration to host surface-to-air interceptors, radars, and other elements of the planned Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) system. In addition to changes on the ground, the system is expected to come along with new airspace restrictions, particularly around radar sites that will be in constant operation and present potential electromagnetic interference hazards.

The U.S. military held multiple so-called "public scoping meetings" on Guam earlier this month to provide information about the planned EIAMD system to residents and solicit feedback. Members of the public have until August 18 to submit further comments and criticisms about the project and its potential environmental impacts.

Included in the information that the U.S. military provided was a map showing the location of various candidate sites for hosting different elements of the EIAMD system and another one showing radar arcs and restricted airspace zones that are set to come along with it.

"The missile defense system would be able to defend Guam a full 360 degrees around the entirety of the island. The 360-degree capability would be achieved by distributing/placing system components at multiple locations around the island," a block of text accompanying the candidate site map explains. "Site selection is evolving and additional sites may be considered."

A map showing the 20 sites on Guam under consideration to host elements of the Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense system. It also gives an overview of existing facilities belonging to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. MDA


"If the Proposed Action is implemented, MDA [Missile Defense Agency] and the Army would construct the Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) and it would operate continuously," additional text providing context for the radar/airspace map says. "FAA [the Federal Aviation Administration] would take actions related to restricting the flight of aircraft in airspace where high-intensity radiated fields would exceed FAA certification standards for aircraft electrical and electronic systems."

"Implementation of the Proposed Action would result in the establishment of new Restricted Areas and change federal airways and instrument flight procedures to accommodate new Restricted Areas," it adds. "MDA and the Army would not begin continuous operation of the EIAMD system until FAA actions related to restricting the flight of aircraft are complete."

Particular concerns about the impacts on Guam from the installation of the myriad new radars that are part of the EIAMD have come up before and the U.S. military has previously acknowledged this as a topic area requiring special attention.

"So, when you think about transporting yourself to some other location, whether it's in the United States or abroad, you have to worry about explosive arcs... you have to worry about the electromagnetic interference of the radars," now-retired Vice Adm. Jon Hill, then head of MDA, said last year. "So, one of the first conflicts we had, it's been in the press already, but I think it's resolved, is if you're going to build a hospital on this site, and you have a radar over here, is it okay to put radar energy through that site where you bring MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] helicopters in? The answer's no."

As currently planned, EIAMD is a distributed and tiered 'system of systems' intended to provide 360-degree air and missile for Guam, as a whole, against various types of aerial threats. The island, which is a U.S. territory, is strategically located in the western Pacific and is home to major Air Force, Navy, and now Marine Corps bases.

These would be among the top of the list of priority targets for an opponent during any future high-end conflict in the region, such as one against China.

A version of the Aegis Ashore system tailored to Guam's unique geography and other requirements will be at the core of EIAMD. This is expected to look significantly different from U.S. Aegis Ashore sites currently in Romania and Poland, the latter of which is not yet operational, but is expected to be later this year. The U.S. military has a dedicated Aegis Ashore test site in Hawaii.

As originally designed, Aegis Ashore directly ported over various components, including the AN/SPY-1 radar and Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), from the Flight IIA Arleigh Burke class destroyer into a land-based configuration. The primary interceptors for the system have long been variants of the SM-3, including the Block IIA variant designed to be able to engage intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) during the mid-course portion of their flight outside of the Earth's atmosphere.

Thanks to the multi-purpose nature of the Mk 41 VLS, additional missiles, such as variants of the multi-purpose SM-6 and the now-in-development Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), which is being designed to engage incoming hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, could be integrated into the system in the future.

The exact configuration of Guam's Aegis Ashore system remains to be seen. However, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has made clear in the past that it will be distributed to a far greater extent than its predecessors. There have been discussions in the past about installing certain components in hardened underground facilitiesor putting them on road-mobile ground platforms.

What is known now is that the higher-end tier of the EIAMD will also include at least four AN/TPY-6 radars. This design was previously known as the Homeland Defense Radar-Guam and leverages technology from Lockheed Martin's Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) now in place in Alaska.

The U.S. Army is planning to provide Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile systems, Patriot surface-to-air missile systems, Typhon Mid-Range Capability systems (which can fire SM-6 multi-purpose missiles, as well as Tomahawk cruise missiles), and Enduring Shield Indirect Fire Protection Systems, to provide lower layers of air and missile defense coverage.

THAAD, Patriot, and Typhons with SM-6 would offer options for engaging various types of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as fixed-wing aircraft and other aerial threats. Enduring Shield, which will at least initially fire AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles, is designed to offer additional protection against cruise missiles, drones, and even artillery rockets.

The War Zonehas repeatedly highlighted the very real threat posed now by drones, including very low-end commercial types that can be readily weaponized, or used for surveillance or other malign purposes, pose to U.S. forces abroad and at home, including on Guam.

A rendering of Enduring Shield launchers firing AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles. Dynetics

An Army THAAD battery has already been forward-deployed on Guam since 2013. The Army also deployed Iron Dome systems, comparable in form and function to Enduring Shield, as part of a test in 2021.

The Army's contribution to the new EIAMD on Guam will also include at least three Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radars, as well as multiple smaller Sentinel types, distributed around the island.

A command and control architecture that includes elements of the Navy's Aegis Combat System and the Army's Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) will help tie all this together, allowing for a great deal of flexibility and general situational awareness. The networks will also help Guam's defenders choose different interceptors and associated sensors, as well as fuze data to produce higher fidelity tracking and targeting data, to best respond to different types of incoming threats and do so faster and with greater accuracy.

Those networks will be able to feed in information from offboard sources, as well. This includes existing and future space-based sensing assets. Work is already progressing on the development of a new hypersonic weapon-focused tracking constellation that is expected to eventually include dozens of individual satellites.

Guam’s Airspace Set To Be Most Defended On Earth In New Plans

Sites all over the island and permanent airspace closures will be part of turning Guam into a fortress unlike any other.

www.twz.com

 

[DF-41]

Go Brandon!!!

70% OF F-35s MAY NOT BE COMBAT READY

A Government Accountability Office report reveals up to 85% of F-35s might lack combat readiness, contrary to the perceived 55% mission-capable rate.

The "full mission capable" rate is around 30%, with the Marine Corps F-35B variant at a mere 15.5% in March 2023.

Source: @zerohedge

 

[nahtanbob]

Are people simply forgetting that as China grows into a military superpower in the 2030s then it will start building bases in friendly countries like Pakistan?

China's current geographical vulnerability will be sorted in time as it reclaims Taiwan and starts building naval bases in friendly countries in Asia and Africa.

nothing stops China right now

 

[Yommie]

nothing stops China right now

China is 4,000 years old. China has witnessed the rise and fall of numerous hegemonies. China refuse to be hegemony. It's the only way for China to survive.

 

[S10]

Five is a good number of carrier groups. China should start heavily focusing on naval drones and submarines. These are the future.