KingMamba
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Pakistan should keep in mind that TTP joining Daesh is a really real possibility.
Pak-Afghan Border Skirmishes and Terrorism Watch
- Thread starter ghazi52
- Start date
RescueRanger
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- Sep 20, 2008
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Tackling the Taliban!
I jest.
Long post warning.
Well to start with lets see what 2023 brought us: PART 1
For the third year in a row, the number of terrorist attacks and consequent casualties posted an upsurge in 2023. A total of 306 terrorist attacks took place in Pakistan in the year – including 23 suicide bombings – which killed 693 people and injured 1,124 others. These attacks marked an increase of 17 percent from the year before, and the number of people killed in these attacks also represented an increase of 65 percent from those killed in similar attacks during
the previous year.
As many as 330 personnel of security forces and law enforcement agencies were martyred in the reported terrorist attacks in 2023 including 26 FC men, 176 policemen, 110 army officials, 11 Levies, five unspecified paramilitary soldiers, and two Rangers; another 518 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies were also injured. Similarly, 260 civilians lost their lives and another 559 were wounded in these attacks. Meanwhile 103 militants were killed and another 47 were injured, either in suicide blasts they perpetrated, or in security forces’ retaliatory fire following some attacks.
Religiously inspired militant groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other local Taliban groups including Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) and Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, as well as Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), etc., perpetrated a combined total of 208 terrorist attacks – compared to 179 in previous year – which killed 579 people and injured 938 others.
Different Baloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgent groups carried out 86 attacks – as compared to 79 such attacks in 2022 – which claimed 90 lives and wounded another 151 people.
Meanwhile, compared to four in 2022, 12 sectarian-related terrorist attacks were recorded in 2023 that claimed 24 lives and inflicted injuries on another 35 people.
Chart 1: Classification of Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan YE 2023.
As in previous years, security and law enforcement personnel were the prime target of terrorist attacks in 2023. As many as 205 attacks in 2023, or about 67 percent of the total recorded attacks in the year, targeted personnel, vehicles, convoys, and posts or facilities of security and law enforcement agencies.
Civilians were apparently hit in 19 attacks, while another 10 attacks targeted polio vaccination teams and their security escorts, mainly police. Meanwhile terrorists perpetrated nine attacks each against alleged spies/collaborators, and government officials/institutions/state symbols. Another nine attacks hit Sunni religious leaders and community, and five terrorist attacks targeted members of Shia community.
Baloch insurgents also targeted non-Baloch workers and settlers in Balochistan in a total of five attacks. Other sporadic targets hit by the terrorists in 2023 are given at Table 1.
Besides perpetrating 23 suicide and fedayee attacks, the terrorists mainly used direct infantry fire in 160 attacks, improvised explosive devices or IEDs of multiple types in 65 attacks, and hand grenades in 38 attacks. The terrorists also used other attack tactics, though less frequently, including 12 coordinated gun-and-bomb attacks, three rocket attacks, three terrorist acts of sabotage and lynching, and one incident each of mortar attack and beheading.
About 93 percent of the total recorded terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2023 concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces.
As in the year before, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa faced the highest number of attacks for any one region of the country. PIPS recorded a total of 174 terrorist attacks in the province (or about 57 percent of the total attacks in Pakistan in 2023), which claimed 422 lives and injured 782 others. While the number of terrorist attacks posted only a slight increase of three percent from previous year, the number of people killed in these attacks in KP rose significantly by about 43 percent, and that of those injured by 99 percent. That suggests militants resorted to more intensified or high-impact attacks in the province during the year under review.
Secondly, most of the terrorist activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was concentrated in two regions: one, southern KP districts; and second, the provincial capital and its neighboring Khyber district.
Indeed, over 82 percent of the total 174 attacks recorded in KP in 2023 concentrated in the six southern districts of the province (including North and South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat and DI Khan) as well as the provincial capital Peshawar and neighboring Khyber district.
Apart from these two regions, where mostly the TTP and other local Taliban groups remained active in the year 2023, a third KP region, i.e., Bajaur, also remained a flashpoint of terrorist violence that was mainly perpetrated by the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) terrorist group. As many 10 attacks happened in Bajaur and most of these were claimed by the IS-K. On the whole, terrorist attacks were recorded from 22 districts of the KP province in 2023.
Image 1: Terrorism related fatalities by district 2022-2023
Moreover, about 75 percent of the total reported attacks from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa targeted personnel of security and law enforcement agencies, mainly army and police. Balochistan was the second most terrorism-affected province in 2023, after Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Baloch insurgent groups as well as religiously inspired militant groups perpetrated a total of 110 attacks in the province, compared to 79 in previous year. These attacks claimed 229 lives, compared to 106 in the year before, and wounded 282 others.
Different Baloch insurgent groups, mainly the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), perpetrated 78 attacks in Balochistan killing 86 people and wounding 137 others. The attacks by Baloch insurgent groups spread over 19 districts, mainly in central, southern and southwestern parts of the province, and largely targeted security forces.
Meanwhile, religiously inspired militant groups such as the TTP, Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan, and the Islamic State terrorist group (IS-K), etc., perpetrated 29 attacks in Balochistan, up from seven in previous year, which caused death to 139 people and injuries to another 144 people. While the TTP and affiliates perpetrated most of the attacks in northern, or largely Pashtun-populated districts of the province including those bordering on Afghanistan and KP, the IS-K was found more active in Mastung, Bolan and Kalat districts. Meanwhile, three sectarian- related attacks killed four and wounded one person in Balochistan in 2023.
Compared to eight in the previous year, 15 terrorist attacks took place in Sindh province including 14 attacks in Karachi alone, and one attack in Jamshoro in interior Sindh. These attacks killed a total of 16 people and injured 26 others. Seven of the reported attacks from Sindh in 2023 were perpetrated by sub-nationalist insurgent groups including four attacks by Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) in Karachi and Jamshoro, and three by Baloch insurgent groups BLA and BLF in Karachi. Meanwhile, indicating a relative rise in sectarian violence, as many as seven sectarian-related terrorist attacks also took place in Karachi that claimed six
lives and injured two others. The banned TTP also perpetrated a gun-and-bomb coordinated attack on the Karachi Police Office martyring four people (3 attackers were also killed) and injuring 17 others.
Six terrorist attacks took place in Punjab in 2023, compared to five in the year before, which claimed 16 lives and injured eight others. Four of these attacks were perpetrated by the TTP and Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan, including three in Mianwali and one in Khanewal, which targeted law enforcement and intelligence officials. For one, security forces repulsed a major gun and bomb assault on the Mianwali Training Air Base of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in November by killing all nine attackers of TJP. Meanwhile, a Baloch insurgent group Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA) claimed one IED blast that targeted Jaffar Express near Chichawatni in Sahiwal district, killing a woman and injuring seven others. Separately, a member of Sikh community, Paramjit Singh Panjwar, was shot dead by unknown attackers in Lahore.
One, apparently, sectarian-related terrorist attack was recorded in Diamir (Gilgit-Baltistan), which claimed 10 lives and wounded 26 others.
(See Table 2)
Security Landscape
I jest.
Long post warning.
Well to start with lets see what 2023 brought us: PART 1
For the third year in a row, the number of terrorist attacks and consequent casualties posted an upsurge in 2023. A total of 306 terrorist attacks took place in Pakistan in the year – including 23 suicide bombings – which killed 693 people and injured 1,124 others. These attacks marked an increase of 17 percent from the year before, and the number of people killed in these attacks also represented an increase of 65 percent from those killed in similar attacks during
the previous year.
As many as 330 personnel of security forces and law enforcement agencies were martyred in the reported terrorist attacks in 2023 including 26 FC men, 176 policemen, 110 army officials, 11 Levies, five unspecified paramilitary soldiers, and two Rangers; another 518 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies were also injured. Similarly, 260 civilians lost their lives and another 559 were wounded in these attacks. Meanwhile 103 militants were killed and another 47 were injured, either in suicide blasts they perpetrated, or in security forces’ retaliatory fire following some attacks.
Religiously inspired militant groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other local Taliban groups including Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) and Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, as well as Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), etc., perpetrated a combined total of 208 terrorist attacks – compared to 179 in previous year – which killed 579 people and injured 938 others.
Different Baloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgent groups carried out 86 attacks – as compared to 79 such attacks in 2022 – which claimed 90 lives and wounded another 151 people.
Meanwhile, compared to four in 2022, 12 sectarian-related terrorist attacks were recorded in 2023 that claimed 24 lives and inflicted injuries on another 35 people.
Chart 1: Classification of Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan YE 2023.
As in previous years, security and law enforcement personnel were the prime target of terrorist attacks in 2023. As many as 205 attacks in 2023, or about 67 percent of the total recorded attacks in the year, targeted personnel, vehicles, convoys, and posts or facilities of security and law enforcement agencies.
Civilians were apparently hit in 19 attacks, while another 10 attacks targeted polio vaccination teams and their security escorts, mainly police. Meanwhile terrorists perpetrated nine attacks each against alleged spies/collaborators, and government officials/institutions/state symbols. Another nine attacks hit Sunni religious leaders and community, and five terrorist attacks targeted members of Shia community.
Baloch insurgents also targeted non-Baloch workers and settlers in Balochistan in a total of five attacks. Other sporadic targets hit by the terrorists in 2023 are given at Table 1.
Besides perpetrating 23 suicide and fedayee attacks, the terrorists mainly used direct infantry fire in 160 attacks, improvised explosive devices or IEDs of multiple types in 65 attacks, and hand grenades in 38 attacks. The terrorists also used other attack tactics, though less frequently, including 12 coordinated gun-and-bomb attacks, three rocket attacks, three terrorist acts of sabotage and lynching, and one incident each of mortar attack and beheading.
About 93 percent of the total recorded terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2023 concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces.
As in the year before, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa faced the highest number of attacks for any one region of the country. PIPS recorded a total of 174 terrorist attacks in the province (or about 57 percent of the total attacks in Pakistan in 2023), which claimed 422 lives and injured 782 others. While the number of terrorist attacks posted only a slight increase of three percent from previous year, the number of people killed in these attacks in KP rose significantly by about 43 percent, and that of those injured by 99 percent. That suggests militants resorted to more intensified or high-impact attacks in the province during the year under review.
Secondly, most of the terrorist activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was concentrated in two regions: one, southern KP districts; and second, the provincial capital and its neighboring Khyber district.
Indeed, over 82 percent of the total 174 attacks recorded in KP in 2023 concentrated in the six southern districts of the province (including North and South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat and DI Khan) as well as the provincial capital Peshawar and neighboring Khyber district.
Apart from these two regions, where mostly the TTP and other local Taliban groups remained active in the year 2023, a third KP region, i.e., Bajaur, also remained a flashpoint of terrorist violence that was mainly perpetrated by the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) terrorist group. As many 10 attacks happened in Bajaur and most of these were claimed by the IS-K. On the whole, terrorist attacks were recorded from 22 districts of the KP province in 2023.
Image 1: Terrorism related fatalities by district 2022-2023
Moreover, about 75 percent of the total reported attacks from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa targeted personnel of security and law enforcement agencies, mainly army and police. Balochistan was the second most terrorism-affected province in 2023, after Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Baloch insurgent groups as well as religiously inspired militant groups perpetrated a total of 110 attacks in the province, compared to 79 in previous year. These attacks claimed 229 lives, compared to 106 in the year before, and wounded 282 others.
Different Baloch insurgent groups, mainly the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), perpetrated 78 attacks in Balochistan killing 86 people and wounding 137 others. The attacks by Baloch insurgent groups spread over 19 districts, mainly in central, southern and southwestern parts of the province, and largely targeted security forces.
Meanwhile, religiously inspired militant groups such as the TTP, Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan, and the Islamic State terrorist group (IS-K), etc., perpetrated 29 attacks in Balochistan, up from seven in previous year, which caused death to 139 people and injuries to another 144 people. While the TTP and affiliates perpetrated most of the attacks in northern, or largely Pashtun-populated districts of the province including those bordering on Afghanistan and KP, the IS-K was found more active in Mastung, Bolan and Kalat districts. Meanwhile, three sectarian- related attacks killed four and wounded one person in Balochistan in 2023.
Compared to eight in the previous year, 15 terrorist attacks took place in Sindh province including 14 attacks in Karachi alone, and one attack in Jamshoro in interior Sindh. These attacks killed a total of 16 people and injured 26 others. Seven of the reported attacks from Sindh in 2023 were perpetrated by sub-nationalist insurgent groups including four attacks by Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) in Karachi and Jamshoro, and three by Baloch insurgent groups BLA and BLF in Karachi. Meanwhile, indicating a relative rise in sectarian violence, as many as seven sectarian-related terrorist attacks also took place in Karachi that claimed six
lives and injured two others. The banned TTP also perpetrated a gun-and-bomb coordinated attack on the Karachi Police Office martyring four people (3 attackers were also killed) and injuring 17 others.
Six terrorist attacks took place in Punjab in 2023, compared to five in the year before, which claimed 16 lives and injured eight others. Four of these attacks were perpetrated by the TTP and Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan, including three in Mianwali and one in Khanewal, which targeted law enforcement and intelligence officials. For one, security forces repulsed a major gun and bomb assault on the Mianwali Training Air Base of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in November by killing all nine attackers of TJP. Meanwhile, a Baloch insurgent group Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA) claimed one IED blast that targeted Jaffar Express near Chichawatni in Sahiwal district, killing a woman and injuring seven others. Separately, a member of Sikh community, Paramjit Singh Panjwar, was shot dead by unknown attackers in Lahore.
One, apparently, sectarian-related terrorist attack was recorded in Diamir (Gilgit-Baltistan), which claimed 10 lives and wounded 26 others.
(See Table 2)
Security Landscape
RescueRanger
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- Sep 20, 2008
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-Cont-
Comparison
Overall, 498 incidents of conflict-related violence of different types – as listed at Table 3 – were recorded in Pakistan in 2023. Apart from 306 terrorist attacks cited earlier, these violent incidents also included: security forces' 129 anti-militant operational or kinetic strikes and their 24 armed clashes/encounters with militants; a combined total of 12 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, India and Iran; 10 incidents of communal/faith-based violence including mob attacks; seven (7) terror plots or bids; four (4) incidents of sectarian clashes; two incidents each of political/ethnic violence and inter-tribal clashes/attacks; one inter-militant clash/attack; and one act of abduction. These overall incidents of violence killed a total of 1,232 people and injured 1,254 others.
The number of overall incidents of conflict-related violence posted an increase of over 25 percent, from 398 in 2022 to 498 in 2023. As in the year before, the increase in overall violent incidents was mainly contributed by an upturn recorded in the number of terrorist attacks as well as counter terrorism operations. The overall number of people killed in these violent incidents also increased, by over 48 percent; from 832 in 2022 to 1,232 in 2023. (See Chart2)
As cited earlier, for the third year in a row the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan posted an upsurge in the year 2023. This upsurge in terrorist violence in Pakistan also coincided with the Taliban's rise to power in the neighboring Afghanistan.
Indeed, the year 2020 was the last year that had witnessed a relative decline in terrorist violence in Pakistan; that decline had been ongoing since 2014-15 following the military operations in ex-FATA, Karachi and an extensive counter-militancy campaign across the country including as part of National Action Plan. But from 2021-onward this declining trend did not sustain, and the incidence of terrorist attacks took an upturn. (See Chart 3 and Table 4)
As described in the Table 4, in the year 2023 the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan marked an increase of 17 percent from the previous year.
That comparative upsurge in terrorist violence was contributed by an increase in the number of attacks reported from all four provinces. The frequency of terrorist incidents in the Balochistan province increased by 39 percent, compared to 2022, and the number of those killed in these attacks also increased, by 116 percent. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, although the number of attacks rose marginally (by 3 percent) from previous year, but the number of people killed in these attacks increased by 43 percent and those of injured by 99 percent.
Similarly, the incidence of terrorist violence in Punjab and Sindh also increased in 2023, by 100
percent and 87 percent, respectively.
Compared to 14 in the year before, as many as 23 suicide and fedayee attacks happened in
2023 including 18 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and five in Balochistan. These attacks claimed 315
lives – compared to 108 in 2022 – and injured 560 others. As many as 22 of these suicide
attacks were carried out by different religiously inspired militant groups, while one attack was
perpetrated by a Baloch insurgent group BLA in Turbat (Kech) in Balochistan.
Among religiously inspired militants, the TTP was reportedly involved in 11 recorded suicide attacks, including four attacks each in Khyber and North Waziristan, and one attack each in Bannu, Peshawar (in KP) and Quetta (in Balochistan). All suicide blasts by the TTP targeted security forces and law enforcement agencies. The worst of suicide blasts by the TTP was the one that hit policemen in Police Lines mosque, Peshawar on January 30 martyring over 84 people including 81 policemen.
Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), which is considered a TTP's subsidiary or coverup group, claimed four suicide attacks in Peshawar, Bajaur, DI Khan and Lakki Marwat targeting security forces. One of the TJP-coordinated suicide attacks martyred 23 army soldiers in DI Khan on December 12. Hafiz Gul Bahadur group perpetrated two suicide blasts in Bannu targeting security forces that martyred nine soldiers and two civilians. Meanwhile, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) perpetrated three major suicide bombings in 2023 including one each in Bolan (martyring 9 Balochistan Constabulary officials and one civilian), Bajaur (martyring 64 civilians in a JUI-F political gathering), and Mastung (martyring over 63 people in a 12th Rabiul Awwal (the birthday of the holy prophet (PBUH) procession). Meanwhile, two suicide bombings (in Zhob in Balochistan and Hangu in KP) remained unclaimed.
A total of 12 violent incidents (attacks and clashes) took place at Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran, compared to 15 such incidents in the year before. These incidents claimed 26 lives (10 civilians, seven army soldiers, and nine militants) and injured 21 others.
Seven of these incidents happened at or from across the country's border with Afghanistan
including six in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and one in Balochistan, killing 14 people and injuring 17
others. These seven incidents only entail the border happenings and don’t include the
incursions by the TTP or other militants wherein they crossed the border and carried out attacks
inside Pakistan.
Meanwhile four attacks happened from across the Line of Control (in Kotli, Neelum and Poonch districts of AJK), and Working Boundary with India (in Sialkot, Punjab) that caused in all eight deaths and injuries to another four people. Apparently the situation at Pak-India border is not as calm as it had been following February 2021, when Pakistan and India recommitted themselves to the 2003 ceasefire arrangement at the Line of Control.
Similarly, another attack was reported from across the Iranian border in Kech (Balochistan),
which claimed the life of four army soldiers. Compared to 87 in the year before, security forces and law enforcement agencies conducted 129 anti-militant operational strikes in Pakistan in 2023.
These actions caused a total of 425 fatalities (373 militants, 43 army soldiers, five policemen, two Levies, and two civilians), as compared to 327 in 2022, besides injuring 51 others. Out of the total 129 operational strikes recorded in 2023, as many as 97 happened in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 28 in Balochistan, three in Punjab, and one in Sindh's provincial capital, i.e., Karachi. While the anti-militant operations were reported from 31 districts and regions across Pakistan, however there were only nine districts where five or more such operations happened in the year. These were Kech and
Quetta in Balochistan, and Bannu, DI Khan, Khyber, North and South Waziristan, Peshawar, and Tank districts in KP. The highest number of kinetic operations for any one district was reported from North Waziristan (21 operations), followed by DI Khan (17), South Waziristan (12), Khyber (9), Peshawar and Tank (8 operations each), and Kech (7 operations).
Security and law enforcement agencies also entered into in a total of 24 armed clashes and encounters with militants – compared to 11 such incidents in previous year – in 13 districts or regions of the country. These armed clashes and encounters claimed 55 lives (37 militants, 16
army soldiers, and 2 policemen) and injured two militants and one policeman. As many as 21
of these clashes and encounters (or over 87 percent) took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(mainly between the security forces and the TTP militants). Meanwhile, two such clashes
happened in Punjab and one in Karachi.
Compared to eight in 2022, as many as 10 incidents of communal or faith-based violence
including four incidents of mob violence were also recorded in Pakistan in 2023. These incidents
claimed the lives of three [Muslim] persons accused of blasphemy in Sheikhupura (Punjab),
Mardan (KP) and Kech (Balochistan), and injured 16 others including 15 Hindu students in
Lahore and one member of Christian community in Faisalabad.
Few highlights of communal violence in 2023 included attacks on and sabotage/ransacking of at least four worship places of Ahmadi community in Karachi, as well as torching and ransacking of at least 19 churches, and 86 residences of members of the Christian community in Faisalabad.
Overall, these incidents of communal and mob violence targeted worship places and members of Ahmadi community in four attacks, blasphemy-accused individuals in three attacks, Christian community and churches in two incidences, and members of Hindu community in one such incident.
Sectarian violence has apparently also picked up in Pakistan as in the year under review a total
of 43 people lost their lives and another 61 were injured in 12 sectarian-related terrorist attacks
and four sectarian clashes. Incidents of sectarian violence were reported mainly from Karachi
in Sindh (7 incidents), Kurram in KP (5), Mastung and Quetta in Balochistan (3), and Diamir in
Gilgit-Baltistan (one incident).
The number of people killed in overall violent incidents in 2023 (1,232) represented an increase of about 48 percent from those killed in such incidents in the year before (832). The reported increase in fatalities was marked by the martyrdom of 405 personnel of security forces and law enforcement agencies in overall violent incidents, compared to 264 in previous year.
Fatalities among civilians in 2023 (302) were nonetheless over 64 percent more from the previous year’s fatalities among them (184). There was also an increased number of militants killed (525), in these violent incidents, compared to 2022 when 384 militants were reportedly killed. (See Table 6)
-Cont-
Comparison
Overall, 498 incidents of conflict-related violence of different types – as listed at Table 3 – were recorded in Pakistan in 2023. Apart from 306 terrorist attacks cited earlier, these violent incidents also included: security forces' 129 anti-militant operational or kinetic strikes and their 24 armed clashes/encounters with militants; a combined total of 12 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, India and Iran; 10 incidents of communal/faith-based violence including mob attacks; seven (7) terror plots or bids; four (4) incidents of sectarian clashes; two incidents each of political/ethnic violence and inter-tribal clashes/attacks; one inter-militant clash/attack; and one act of abduction. These overall incidents of violence killed a total of 1,232 people and injured 1,254 others.
The number of overall incidents of conflict-related violence posted an increase of over 25 percent, from 398 in 2022 to 498 in 2023. As in the year before, the increase in overall violent incidents was mainly contributed by an upturn recorded in the number of terrorist attacks as well as counter terrorism operations. The overall number of people killed in these violent incidents also increased, by over 48 percent; from 832 in 2022 to 1,232 in 2023. (See Chart2)
As cited earlier, for the third year in a row the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan posted an upsurge in the year 2023. This upsurge in terrorist violence in Pakistan also coincided with the Taliban's rise to power in the neighboring Afghanistan.
Indeed, the year 2020 was the last year that had witnessed a relative decline in terrorist violence in Pakistan; that decline had been ongoing since 2014-15 following the military operations in ex-FATA, Karachi and an extensive counter-militancy campaign across the country including as part of National Action Plan. But from 2021-onward this declining trend did not sustain, and the incidence of terrorist attacks took an upturn. (See Chart 3 and Table 4)
As described in the Table 4, in the year 2023 the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan marked an increase of 17 percent from the previous year.
That comparative upsurge in terrorist violence was contributed by an increase in the number of attacks reported from all four provinces. The frequency of terrorist incidents in the Balochistan province increased by 39 percent, compared to 2022, and the number of those killed in these attacks also increased, by 116 percent. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, although the number of attacks rose marginally (by 3 percent) from previous year, but the number of people killed in these attacks increased by 43 percent and those of injured by 99 percent.
Similarly, the incidence of terrorist violence in Punjab and Sindh also increased in 2023, by 100
percent and 87 percent, respectively.
Compared to 14 in the year before, as many as 23 suicide and fedayee attacks happened in
2023 including 18 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and five in Balochistan. These attacks claimed 315
lives – compared to 108 in 2022 – and injured 560 others. As many as 22 of these suicide
attacks were carried out by different religiously inspired militant groups, while one attack was
perpetrated by a Baloch insurgent group BLA in Turbat (Kech) in Balochistan.
Among religiously inspired militants, the TTP was reportedly involved in 11 recorded suicide attacks, including four attacks each in Khyber and North Waziristan, and one attack each in Bannu, Peshawar (in KP) and Quetta (in Balochistan). All suicide blasts by the TTP targeted security forces and law enforcement agencies. The worst of suicide blasts by the TTP was the one that hit policemen in Police Lines mosque, Peshawar on January 30 martyring over 84 people including 81 policemen.
Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), which is considered a TTP's subsidiary or coverup group, claimed four suicide attacks in Peshawar, Bajaur, DI Khan and Lakki Marwat targeting security forces. One of the TJP-coordinated suicide attacks martyred 23 army soldiers in DI Khan on December 12. Hafiz Gul Bahadur group perpetrated two suicide blasts in Bannu targeting security forces that martyred nine soldiers and two civilians. Meanwhile, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) perpetrated three major suicide bombings in 2023 including one each in Bolan (martyring 9 Balochistan Constabulary officials and one civilian), Bajaur (martyring 64 civilians in a JUI-F political gathering), and Mastung (martyring over 63 people in a 12th Rabiul Awwal (the birthday of the holy prophet (PBUH) procession). Meanwhile, two suicide bombings (in Zhob in Balochistan and Hangu in KP) remained unclaimed.
A total of 12 violent incidents (attacks and clashes) took place at Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran, compared to 15 such incidents in the year before. These incidents claimed 26 lives (10 civilians, seven army soldiers, and nine militants) and injured 21 others.
Seven of these incidents happened at or from across the country's border with Afghanistan
including six in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and one in Balochistan, killing 14 people and injuring 17
others. These seven incidents only entail the border happenings and don’t include the
incursions by the TTP or other militants wherein they crossed the border and carried out attacks
inside Pakistan.
Meanwhile four attacks happened from across the Line of Control (in Kotli, Neelum and Poonch districts of AJK), and Working Boundary with India (in Sialkot, Punjab) that caused in all eight deaths and injuries to another four people. Apparently the situation at Pak-India border is not as calm as it had been following February 2021, when Pakistan and India recommitted themselves to the 2003 ceasefire arrangement at the Line of Control.
Similarly, another attack was reported from across the Iranian border in Kech (Balochistan),
which claimed the life of four army soldiers. Compared to 87 in the year before, security forces and law enforcement agencies conducted 129 anti-militant operational strikes in Pakistan in 2023.
These actions caused a total of 425 fatalities (373 militants, 43 army soldiers, five policemen, two Levies, and two civilians), as compared to 327 in 2022, besides injuring 51 others. Out of the total 129 operational strikes recorded in 2023, as many as 97 happened in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 28 in Balochistan, three in Punjab, and one in Sindh's provincial capital, i.e., Karachi. While the anti-militant operations were reported from 31 districts and regions across Pakistan, however there were only nine districts where five or more such operations happened in the year. These were Kech and
Quetta in Balochistan, and Bannu, DI Khan, Khyber, North and South Waziristan, Peshawar, and Tank districts in KP. The highest number of kinetic operations for any one district was reported from North Waziristan (21 operations), followed by DI Khan (17), South Waziristan (12), Khyber (9), Peshawar and Tank (8 operations each), and Kech (7 operations).
Security and law enforcement agencies also entered into in a total of 24 armed clashes and encounters with militants – compared to 11 such incidents in previous year – in 13 districts or regions of the country. These armed clashes and encounters claimed 55 lives (37 militants, 16
army soldiers, and 2 policemen) and injured two militants and one policeman. As many as 21
of these clashes and encounters (or over 87 percent) took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(mainly between the security forces and the TTP militants). Meanwhile, two such clashes
happened in Punjab and one in Karachi.
Compared to eight in 2022, as many as 10 incidents of communal or faith-based violence
including four incidents of mob violence were also recorded in Pakistan in 2023. These incidents
claimed the lives of three [Muslim] persons accused of blasphemy in Sheikhupura (Punjab),
Mardan (KP) and Kech (Balochistan), and injured 16 others including 15 Hindu students in
Lahore and one member of Christian community in Faisalabad.
Few highlights of communal violence in 2023 included attacks on and sabotage/ransacking of at least four worship places of Ahmadi community in Karachi, as well as torching and ransacking of at least 19 churches, and 86 residences of members of the Christian community in Faisalabad.
Overall, these incidents of communal and mob violence targeted worship places and members of Ahmadi community in four attacks, blasphemy-accused individuals in three attacks, Christian community and churches in two incidences, and members of Hindu community in one such incident.
Sectarian violence has apparently also picked up in Pakistan as in the year under review a total
of 43 people lost their lives and another 61 were injured in 12 sectarian-related terrorist attacks
and four sectarian clashes. Incidents of sectarian violence were reported mainly from Karachi
in Sindh (7 incidents), Kurram in KP (5), Mastung and Quetta in Balochistan (3), and Diamir in
Gilgit-Baltistan (one incident).
The number of people killed in overall violent incidents in 2023 (1,232) represented an increase of about 48 percent from those killed in such incidents in the year before (832). The reported increase in fatalities was marked by the martyrdom of 405 personnel of security forces and law enforcement agencies in overall violent incidents, compared to 264 in previous year.
Fatalities among civilians in 2023 (302) were nonetheless over 64 percent more from the previous year’s fatalities among them (184). There was also an increased number of militants killed (525), in these violent incidents, compared to 2022 when 384 militants were reportedly killed. (See Table 6)
-Cont-
RescueRanger
Moderator
- Sep 20, 2008
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-Cont-
The Balochistan problem:
Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic, a federation made up of many different units. Pakistan has confronted the challenge of nationalist dogma based in the ethnic identities within its provinces of Balochistan, KP, GB and Sindh between issues of agency, political autonomy, resource allocation and economic inequality. Ever mounting governance issues, political instability, discrimination, enfeebled social development have also been among key issues. The national economic pressure, growing financial insecurity and income disparity and a sense of deprivation in less developed regions, particularly Balochistan have indeed remained threats to Pakistan's internal security.
Image 2: Ethno-linguistic map of Baloch people [Author's Own Work - Map Adopted from copyright free academic literature***]
The Baloch people are a unique ethno-linguistic group spread between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Infested with several insurgents, religious extremist and sectarian groups, the security landscape of Balochistan has become exceedingly complex over the last few years. The death of Nawab Akbar Bugti on August 26, 2006 in a military operation had instigated the current phase of the Baloch insurgency, the fourth one since the creation of Pakistan.
Baloch insurgents have launched attacks on state institutions, security forces, gas and power installations and on non-Baloch individuals in the province since Nawab Bugti’s death. The role of Baloch insurgents in compounding Balochistan’s law and order woes notwithstanding, several religiously motivated militant and sectarian groups have also grown in strength and expanded their areas of operation across Balochistan.
Quetta, the provincial capital, is becoming a hub of local and foreign religious militant groups and sectarian outfits. There have been numerous media reports of attacks on barbershops, music shops and on other “un-Islamic” businesses by religious extremists including the Taliban in Quetta in the recent past. Meanwhile, the Shia Hazara community in Balochistan, with a population of around 300,000 people, is currently facing unprecedented attacks and violence, mainly from sectarian militant groups.
Terrorist attacks and targeted killings, mainly perpetrated by Baloch insurgents and religious extremists, have gradually increased in the province, particularly after 2006. Around 110 attacks have killed 229 people and injured another 282 in Balochistan in the year 2023. This marks a 116% increase in the number of terrorist attack related casualties in the province when compared with the previous year.1 [PIPS report 2023]
Government of Pakistan initiated a number of steps to build confidence which in the past have included Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan in 2009, Financial commission awards and the 18th Constitutional amendment in 2010 these which include concessions and benefits for the Baloch people. The most recent of which has been the Governance and Policy Project for Balochistan funded by the World Bank costing US$ 19 Million and will aim to strengthen the capacity for revenue mobilization and improve public financial management and accountability for public service de livery in Balochistan.[ https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P156411]
-Part 2-
Part 2: Domestic security posture and wider counter-terrorism strategy
The threat emanating from across the border cannot be denied, this is by no means is an excuse to not consider the ever present malaise of extremism and extremism narratives in our own country for which there is a fertile domestic audience, it is therefore vital to have a multi pronged approach to this problem one which looks at the immediate needs of security and one that works to counter extremist violence and extremist narratives though education, dialogue, opportunities and inclusion.
To examine the issue of domestic terrorism and extremism narratives we must first come to a consensus that terrorism is mainly driven by ideology which is nurtured by people who exploit communities or groups who feel they have lost a sense of agency or feel disillusioned and disenfranchised.
To counter the menace of terrorism what you need is a cultural change, this comes initially through a deep dive study into the drivers of terrorism.
Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset
Despite the noise, we do have a good understanding of the drivers that cause people to move from "disillusioned and disenfranchised" to "disgruntled" through to the "activist" stage - this is the stage where you need to counter the toxic narrative though a number of confidence building measures in the community which can range from inclusion in the democratic process and to build a sense of "ownership" for the communities and a unified identity.
What is required now is for the larger public to understand the "bigger picture" which is a working strategy which needs to consist of education, information, communication, prevention, protection, engagement and enforcement. Fighting ideas with guns and bombs never works in the long run. What is needed is to starve the vipers of their pool of potential recruits by wining hearts and minds and changing the sense of "us against them" narrative.
We need to re-examine our COIN strategy in line with the established "three pillars" of COIN and to do this we need to look at the present conflict ecosystem.
We understand the security and political motivators behind insurgency in Pakistan, we need to start addressing the economic drivers behind the present situation, and work hard for narrative building around counter-ideology, counter-sanctuary and motivation.
What some members here are choosing to ignore either due to ignorance or arrogance by dismissing the relevance of removing Afghans from Pakistan is Kilcullen's strategy on counter insurgency spheres. Kilcullen argues that the conflict ecosystem comprises of the following:
1. Sphere of civilian control and spheres of influence: the civilian population and the influential groups [see PTM et.al], the force behind influence and "clash of civilizations" comes from
1a. Population stereotypes: Entity Stereotypes [see ethnocentrism]
1b. Human cognition: beliefs, values and interests [validation of stereotypes and building of "filter bubbles"].
1c Education and lack thereof
Aarhus model argues that these issues mentioned in [1] and the mindset o [clash of civilization/Orientalism] is then capitalized on by 2:
2. actors including: Insurgents, hostile non-state actors
--
We (GOP) need to counter narrative building by hostile non-state actors and persistent threat actors at the first two stages of the Borum Model.
To counter this we need to focus on revisiting the counterinsurgency doctrine and how we deal with countering violent extremism [CVE]
To help achieve this we need a better understanding and narrative building around "us/them" mindset.
A closer examination of the popular hashtag #AfghanRefueesInPakistan and visualizing the shares and content across multiple platforms shows us engagement and content is driven by a few accounts and retweeted by bots:
To counter this anti-state narrative building by we need educated, informed and unified counter-narrative campaign on SM beyond that provided by the likes of Pro-Pakistan Army SM accounts and opinionators, I propose that patriotic Pakistanis focus on developing accounts similar to NAFO.
Education, Education, Education:
We need to adopt a holistic approach to internal security, This is achieved through what is called ICE: Information, Communication, Education - this can be audio, visual, written or communicated through social mobilizers like the polio education scheme, After all terrorism and violent extremism is no different to any other pandemic.
The key here is "Early intervention" "Early Engagement" and "Public Cooperation":
Only through achieving community "buy-in" and active participation can you counter the menace of terrorism, deny terrorists the funding, freedom of movement and space to share their toxic ideology with a powerful full spectrum counter-terrorism and CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) strategy.
Such a program requires a broad spectrum of input from professionals from all walks of life ranging from humanitarians, community activists, educators, academics, legal professionals, health care (including mental health) professionals, law enforcement, military, and policy makers.
TLDR:
We need to start differentiating between what constitutes "Anti-Terrorism" where force is used and "Counter-Terrorism" where a wider holistic strategy is used, one is like a panadol capsule and provides limited immediate pain relief, the other is like a consultation with a competent doctor that examines the full health of the patient and provides a tailored treatment plan.
Ultimately, Information, Education and Communication are just as vital to our counterinsurgency efforts as bombs and bullets.
--End--
The Balochistan problem:
Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic, a federation made up of many different units. Pakistan has confronted the challenge of nationalist dogma based in the ethnic identities within its provinces of Balochistan, KP, GB and Sindh between issues of agency, political autonomy, resource allocation and economic inequality. Ever mounting governance issues, political instability, discrimination, enfeebled social development have also been among key issues. The national economic pressure, growing financial insecurity and income disparity and a sense of deprivation in less developed regions, particularly Balochistan have indeed remained threats to Pakistan's internal security.
Image 2: Ethno-linguistic map of Baloch people [Author's Own Work - Map Adopted from copyright free academic literature***]
The Baloch people are a unique ethno-linguistic group spread between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Infested with several insurgents, religious extremist and sectarian groups, the security landscape of Balochistan has become exceedingly complex over the last few years. The death of Nawab Akbar Bugti on August 26, 2006 in a military operation had instigated the current phase of the Baloch insurgency, the fourth one since the creation of Pakistan.
Baloch insurgents have launched attacks on state institutions, security forces, gas and power installations and on non-Baloch individuals in the province since Nawab Bugti’s death. The role of Baloch insurgents in compounding Balochistan’s law and order woes notwithstanding, several religiously motivated militant and sectarian groups have also grown in strength and expanded their areas of operation across Balochistan.
Quetta, the provincial capital, is becoming a hub of local and foreign religious militant groups and sectarian outfits. There have been numerous media reports of attacks on barbershops, music shops and on other “un-Islamic” businesses by religious extremists including the Taliban in Quetta in the recent past. Meanwhile, the Shia Hazara community in Balochistan, with a population of around 300,000 people, is currently facing unprecedented attacks and violence, mainly from sectarian militant groups.
Terrorist attacks and targeted killings, mainly perpetrated by Baloch insurgents and religious extremists, have gradually increased in the province, particularly after 2006. Around 110 attacks have killed 229 people and injured another 282 in Balochistan in the year 2023. This marks a 116% increase in the number of terrorist attack related casualties in the province when compared with the previous year.1 [PIPS report 2023]
Government of Pakistan initiated a number of steps to build confidence which in the past have included Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan in 2009, Financial commission awards and the 18th Constitutional amendment in 2010 these which include concessions and benefits for the Baloch people. The most recent of which has been the Governance and Policy Project for Balochistan funded by the World Bank costing US$ 19 Million and will aim to strengthen the capacity for revenue mobilization and improve public financial management and accountability for public service de livery in Balochistan.[ https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P156411]
-Part 2-
Part 2: Domestic security posture and wider counter-terrorism strategy
The threat emanating from across the border cannot be denied, this is by no means is an excuse to not consider the ever present malaise of extremism and extremism narratives in our own country for which there is a fertile domestic audience, it is therefore vital to have a multi pronged approach to this problem one which looks at the immediate needs of security and one that works to counter extremist violence and extremist narratives though education, dialogue, opportunities and inclusion.
To examine the issue of domestic terrorism and extremism narratives we must first come to a consensus that terrorism is mainly driven by ideology which is nurtured by people who exploit communities or groups who feel they have lost a sense of agency or feel disillusioned and disenfranchised.
To counter the menace of terrorism what you need is a cultural change, this comes initially through a deep dive study into the drivers of terrorism.
Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset
Despite the noise, we do have a good understanding of the drivers that cause people to move from "disillusioned and disenfranchised" to "disgruntled" through to the "activist" stage - this is the stage where you need to counter the toxic narrative though a number of confidence building measures in the community which can range from inclusion in the democratic process and to build a sense of "ownership" for the communities and a unified identity.
What is required now is for the larger public to understand the "bigger picture" which is a working strategy which needs to consist of education, information, communication, prevention, protection, engagement and enforcement. Fighting ideas with guns and bombs never works in the long run. What is needed is to starve the vipers of their pool of potential recruits by wining hearts and minds and changing the sense of "us against them" narrative.
We need to re-examine our COIN strategy in line with the established "three pillars" of COIN and to do this we need to look at the present conflict ecosystem.
We understand the security and political motivators behind insurgency in Pakistan, we need to start addressing the economic drivers behind the present situation, and work hard for narrative building around counter-ideology, counter-sanctuary and motivation.
What some members here are choosing to ignore either due to ignorance or arrogance by dismissing the relevance of removing Afghans from Pakistan is Kilcullen's strategy on counter insurgency spheres. Kilcullen argues that the conflict ecosystem comprises of the following:
1. Sphere of civilian control and spheres of influence: the civilian population and the influential groups [see PTM et.al], the force behind influence and "clash of civilizations" comes from
1a. Population stereotypes: Entity Stereotypes [see ethnocentrism]
1b. Human cognition: beliefs, values and interests [validation of stereotypes and building of "filter bubbles"].
1c Education and lack thereof
Aarhus model argues that these issues mentioned in [1] and the mindset o [clash of civilization/Orientalism] is then capitalized on by 2:
2. actors including: Insurgents, hostile non-state actors
--
We (GOP) need to counter narrative building by hostile non-state actors and persistent threat actors at the first two stages of the Borum Model.
To counter this we need to focus on revisiting the counterinsurgency doctrine and how we deal with countering violent extremism [CVE]
To help achieve this we need a better understanding and narrative building around "us/them" mindset.
A closer examination of the popular hashtag #AfghanRefueesInPakistan and visualizing the shares and content across multiple platforms shows us engagement and content is driven by a few accounts and retweeted by bots:
To counter this anti-state narrative building by we need educated, informed and unified counter-narrative campaign on SM beyond that provided by the likes of Pro-Pakistan Army SM accounts and opinionators, I propose that patriotic Pakistanis focus on developing accounts similar to NAFO.
Education, Education, Education:
We need to adopt a holistic approach to internal security, This is achieved through what is called ICE: Information, Communication, Education - this can be audio, visual, written or communicated through social mobilizers like the polio education scheme, After all terrorism and violent extremism is no different to any other pandemic.
The key here is "Early intervention" "Early Engagement" and "Public Cooperation":
Only through achieving community "buy-in" and active participation can you counter the menace of terrorism, deny terrorists the funding, freedom of movement and space to share their toxic ideology with a powerful full spectrum counter-terrorism and CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) strategy.
Such a program requires a broad spectrum of input from professionals from all walks of life ranging from humanitarians, community activists, educators, academics, legal professionals, health care (including mental health) professionals, law enforcement, military, and policy makers.
TLDR:
We need to start differentiating between what constitutes "Anti-Terrorism" where force is used and "Counter-Terrorism" where a wider holistic strategy is used, one is like a panadol capsule and provides limited immediate pain relief, the other is like a consultation with a competent doctor that examines the full health of the patient and provides a tailored treatment plan.
Ultimately, Information, Education and Communication are just as vital to our counterinsurgency efforts as bombs and bullets.
--End--
i just meant pak people are submissive infront of other muslims like afghans & arabs, they would betray their own for these group of people. Of course i believe in muslim brotherhood but not like the way most people see it.
FuturePAF
Think Tank Analyst
- Dec 17, 2014
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The afghans are tribe based and hyper local based. Nuristanis, for example, wouldn’t feel at home in an another region of Afghanistan.
I have always stated that the best long term solution is one that realistically deals with each tribe on a tribe by tribe basis, similar to how the Romans dealt with the German on the frontier for centuries.
This is why I have always said the best is to fortify the border with concrete pillbox bunkers (remember the afghans have night vision and thermal enabled sniper rifles) as well as trading posts on the border to create the right carrot and stick approach.
All stick won’t work.
The Afghans have come off 50 years of fighting all the major powers of the world, so they think they can endure the Pakistani military. The best approach is economic.
Btw, we need to re-read Galula if you want to know how brutal real COIN could actually require. The most effective tactic with afghans have always been Heilborne raids (commandos on at least 2 transport helicopters and covered by at least 2 attack helicopters), but instead of killing HVT, arresting them can be done to extract an agreement with each tribe.
Look at how Rhodesia used “Fire Force” helicopter raids. Remember their limited manpower as well as weak economy and international pressure was their undoing.
The PA needs to remember how Operation Magistral by the soviets in and around Gardez was ultimately unsuccessful.
The Spetnaz basically were only good at catching Afghan convoys.
But Pakistan’s military capacity is limited, so economic might has to be leveraged to achieve overmatch to the Afghans whole of nation mobilization, which the Pakistani public doesn’t seem to be in the mood to do on our side. Pakistan must not make the mistake China makes with Vietnam in 1979.
At the end of the day, Pakistani needs a good relationship with Afghanistan, where they reluctantly accept the interdependence on Pakistan to maintain a stable geo-strategic balance.
Remember it’s the Tribes, it’s always the Tribes, and their ability to make money and survive, in their power struggle for influence with other tribes, currently under the Talib government.
Episode 1: "It's the Tribes, Stupid"
The real enemy in Afghanistan isn't Islamism or jihadism. It's tribalism. Mr. Pressfield compares Alexander the Great's Afghan campaign (330-327 BC) to our o...
youtu.be
Episode 2: "The Citizen Vs. The Tribesman"
Citizen = Western. Tribesman = Eastern. These are two different breeds of cat, who see the world in diametrically opposed ways. Can we Westerners impose "cit...
youtu.be
Last edited:
I agree with you. In Islam, 'brotherhood' does come with strings, it isn't unconditional.
The 'string' is that the 'brother' also follows Islam, especially in terms of treating others justly (according to the rules of Islam).
I also agree that there are people in this world, especially in the Muslim lands, who should be reminded that they're as human as the rest of us. The luck of inheriting oil wealth or whatever doesn't make them intrinsically superior to others.
Sadly, Pakistanis haven't developed the leadership qualities necessary to demand leadership and enforce those rules. Our elites lack vision and they refuse to pursue excellence, which affects our ability to build a strong economy and robust military.
GatlingGun
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- Feb 9, 2024
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Hello dear Khalifa wannabe..
Provide source of your preposterous statement..
Musings
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- Jun 23, 2011
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Just look after your own land and people. Poking your neighbour and attempting to troll Pakistan with posts like this does you no favours.
Appointing retards to be mouthpieces and giving some people access to the net is in itself dangerous.
Appointing retards to be mouthpieces and giving some people access to the net is in itself dangerous.
RescueRanger
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The overall quality of life in Afghanistan worsened by 39% after the Taliban take over, about 40% of Afghan people’s energy decreased after the Taliban’s takeover, while pain and discomfort increased by 40%.
Work capacity, decreased by 32%, while dependence on medicinal substances and medical aids increased by 58% after the Taliban’s takeover.
Social relationship including personal relationships witnessed a 27% decrease.
Afghan household food insecurity rose from 70% prior to the Taliban takeover to 98% after the Taliban’s takeover.
Negative feeling among afghans increases about 66% after Taliban. This result shows that most of people don’t have a good feeling with the political change, and also approximately 32% reduction has happened in thinking, learning, memory and concentration.
In environmental domain, 49% and 45% reduction have happened in financial resources, and opportunities for acquiring new information and skills.
Afghanistan has some of the lowest levels of employment with figures matching those of Angola.
More than half of the population 15,415,620 are illiterate.
And these numpties want to invade Pakistan?
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