Ghostkiller
Full Member
- Dec 17, 2023
- 255
- 220
I mean technically Sadat was right about not moving the division with 2nd army because the Naksa was a trauma for all Egyptians (civilians or military), so by retreating them it will relive the trauma anchored within the soldiers's mentality. Ofc no one is perfect. It was the Golden Era for our Generals.I've been meaning to watch it for quite some time but for some reason I never get around to it lol.
He was a brilliant man but his one battlefield decision almost ruined the entire war effort. And that critical decision wasn't even necessary and wasn't part of the original plan that Shazly had outlined and that was followed & executed to precision and was unbelievably successful, literally. And it's not like he wasn't a military man or strategist, he was with an extensive military background working with Nasser. But that ill-fated decision to move the elite 4th division that was in reserve in the west bank of the canal over to the east was beyond comprehensible. It didn't even have a single justification to it and the reason given about relieving pressure on the Syrians was ridiculous. I don't think he ever admitted that was a huge mistake.
And Shazly who was also blamed for making the terrible decision of moving the 21st division from the 2nd field army south to meet the 25th division from the 3rd army and close the gap prior to the battle of the Chinese Farm was also ill-fated, but at least it was strategiccally sound and important and made sense. The only problem was they didn't time the two moves in unison, or at the same time. The 21st moved south first and then much later the 25th moved north which gave the zionist enough time to throw the full brunt of their armor on each division individually. had it been coordinated properly and they both arrived at the same time, they would've easily overwhelmed the zionist attack. Or at least made them think about it and possibly not attempt it and there would've never been an incursion onto the west bank by the enemy in the first place.
Even after when it still wasn't too late to stop the advancement of Adan to the south or even Sharon into Ismailiya, Shazly begged Sadat to allow him to move a small battalion of armor and especially infantry with saggers from the 2nd Army west to deal with the low number of enemy tanks but Sadat wouldn't budge. His excuse that he didn't want to alarm the rest of the division and men into thinking there was a dangerous situation and have them lose morale was a bit over-justified. There was some element of truth to that, especially that they were all weary of the horrible defeat in 67 and he thought they would panic seeing what would look as a withdrawal, but Shazly said that wouldn't have been the case. Besides, it would've nullified the enemy's advance south and stopped them right at their bridgehead and at least gave the Egyptian forces more time to consolidate more forces to make up for Sadat's other ill-fated decision with the 4th division and its tremendous losses.
So I give him credit for sure, but I also give him negative points for really those horrible tactical decisions.