Israeli missile defences (deployed) - assessment and strategies

[mulj]

Of course they know, the question is what is that solution?

Shaheds in Ukraine use common GNSS signals (Glonass, GPS).

Answer in edited post

 

[UKBengali]

Yes, what you say can work, but Iran has never proved to have terrain guidance.

I would not be surprised if Iran already has this and tested it.

Remember they have to assume that the US will switch off GPS signals in any conflict and so would have had to develop terrain guidance capabilities into their cruise missiles..

Iran is more than technologically capable of developing terrain guidance.

 

[mangekyo]

AHRS take as source data mag, acc, and gyr. After 1,000 mi there is a inevitable error added.

It has more to do with the time it takes for the missile to reach the target, not the distance traveled. Since you are integrating acceleration into velocity and velocity into displacement. The longer the travel duration, the more error is added. But there are many effective filters that can be used and fusion techniques, for instance barometric pressure sensors, GPS (before it's jammed) etc.

Incorrect

You are referencing [mechanical] gyroscopes from 1990’s SCUD or the gyroscope in your iPhones (consumer product)

https://twitter.com/x/status/1773390330211000650

This chart will show you some open source estimates of various forms of military grade gyroscope. Not every gyroscope is created equal even those within the same type class. Obviously real numbers are highly classified.

It’s wildly known that the problem with gyroscopes is the vibration that it undergoes during flight. Thus the general rule of thumb was the longer a missile travels the more vibrations impact the gyroscope and thus eventually weaken its accuracy. Advancements in technology have helped to mitigate this to a great extent.

Laser (IFOG) based military grade gyroscopes retain powerful accuracy and celestial based gyroscopes are the crème de le creme of gyscropes. Iran mastered a break thru manufacturing this class gyroscopes in last decade which reduced CEP from 250 meters down to 10-20 meters. You can see from the image I posted that the gyroscopes used K-4, Keyibar, Fatah, etc have improved by a factor of 10 against early SCUD models. The ones used in Qiam/Emad/Ghadr (lasted gen Shahab-3) are a bit more inaccurate but still vastly improved vs their early 2000’s predecessors.

At the end of the day some Iranian missiles have higher grade gyros vs others. It’s a cost factor that comes into play with this as well as the more advanced [accurate] the gyroscope the more costly it becomes.

Not to mention GPS jamming works on objects flying between 100-50,000 ft altitude. A BM re-entering Israel’s atmosphere at Mach 7 is not running GPS/GLNSS calculations anymore at terminal velocity. Those would have been done mid flight.

Thus GPS jamming is mostly for CMs and drones or low trajectory rockets/artillery. Russia has used it to great success against HIMARS in Ukraine.

You are incorrect. A gyroscope is not a guidance system. It measures angular velocity and nothing more. Reducing vibration or even creating algorithms that filters it out almost completely is easy. Even consumer grade IMUs that cost 20$ can effectively be reduced to an error +/- 1 degree.

 

[BHAN85]

I would not be surprised if Iran already has this and tested it.

Remember they have to assume that the US will switch off GPS signals in any conflict and so would have had to develop terrain guidance capabilities into their cruise missiles..

Iran is more than technologically capable of developing terrain guidance.

Why they haven't proved in Ukraine then?

 

[UKBengali]

Why they haven't proved in Ukraine then?

As they would not have developed for Ukraine since that would not be a necessity for them.

ME region would be their priority.

 

[BHAN85]

.

As they would not have developed for Ukraine since that would not be a necessity for them.

ME region would be their priority.

Russia pays for Shaheds.

And Ukraine has GNSS jammers too.

But Shaheds in Russia use GNSS. If terrain guidance were such a easy thing, Iran would have already used in Ukraine.

 

[KingQamaR]

But Israel can always do jamming to do those systems in Israeli territory.

Jamming any GNSS is easy, the signal in ground is always weak.

You missed one of the main uses of drones: false triggering of the defender.
This has been one of the main uses. The defender starts "defending": radar, weapons, alerts, etc. The attacker may or may not attack. Or the drones may be used to exhaust the defenders's defences. Or the radar of the defenders can be pinpointed for later attack.
Finally, the defender's defense strategies can be so overwhelmed and confused, that the real attacking group can easily work without accurate detection.

 

[BHAN85]

You missed one of the main uses of drones: false triggering of the defender.
This has been one of the main uses. The defender starts "defending": radar, weapons, alerts, etc. The attacker may or may not attack. Or the drones may be used to exhaust the defenders's defences. Or the radar of the defenders can be pinpointed for later attack.
Finally, the defender's defense strategies can be so overwhelmed and confused, that the real attacking group can easily work without accurate detection.

But Iran (Khamenei) said they want to "punish" Israel. i.e.: They dont want to start a full-escale war against Israel.

It's expected a small attack.

Can Iran hit a pair of high value targets in Israel launching something from Iran? I doubt it.

 

[UKBengali]

.

Russia pays for Shaheds.

And Ukraine has GNSS jammers too.

But Shaheds in Russia use GNSS. If terrain guidance were such a easy thing, Iran would have already used in Ukraine.

I think you missed the point.

Shaheds are unlikely to have terrain guidance as they are cheap drones and it is quite costly to incorporate this technology into a cheap drone costing a few thousand US dollars for starters.

Also like I say Iran would not have imaged the area using its spy satellites unlike the ME as it simply has no real need.

 

[BHAN85]

I think you missed the point.

Shaheds are unlikely to have terrain guidance as they are cheap drones and it is quite costly to incorporate this technology into a cheap drone costing a few thousand US dollars for starters.

Also like I say Iran would not have imaged the area using its spy satellites unlike the ME as it simply has no real need.

Russia has a lot of sats, Iran sats are just a few tests of basic functions.

It's a lot more likely Russia has a complete accurate mapping of Ukraine territory, than Iran about Israel.

Shaheds use GNSS receiver, it's a fact. Ukraine downed and published pics of drone boards.


Besides keep in mind: Iran and Israel are in high tensions since more than one decade ago.

If Iran has such capabilities, they would already showed in some test as deterrence.

I think they dont have.

 

[RescueRanger]

Iran can use Russian Glonas or the Chinese Beido. GPS is not the only means available.

As I explained in another thread a while back it doesn’t matter what satellite network is used how GPS works is that it has a very specific SNR [Signal to Noise Ratio] and deviation on this renders any TX/RX module operating at that frequency practically useless.

 

[RescueRanger]

But what guidance method? We are talking about thousand miles.

How can know drones where the hell they are?

GNSS wont be available in Israel in war time.

Valid points, so let’s examine a few things.

1. We know that rockets do hit from inside Gaza and Northern Israel into towns inside northern Israel.

This is because Haifa has a large civilian airport which in order to maintain a safe Aerodrome must not have any jamming see map below:




Israel recognises the risk of rocket attacks from the north so most likely as part of its original ABM strategy has already stationed patriot and iron dome batteries here:


It’s is not inconceivable that Iranian backed groups could launch a swarm of drones to simply exhaust the patriot/iron dome batteries stationed in the north prior to launching unguided rockets.

Again the psychological impact of this alone will be a “checkmate” for Iran in this affair.

 

[BHAN85]

Valid points, so let’s examine a few things.

1. We know that rockets do hit from inside Gaza and Northern Israel into towns inside northern Israel.

This is because Haifa has a large civilian airport which in order to maintain a safe Aerodrome must not have any jamming see map below:

View attachment 33433
View attachment 33434

Israel recognises the risk of rocket attacks from the north so most likely as part of its original ABM strategy has already stationed patriot and iron dome batteries here:
View attachment 33435

It’s is not inconceivable that Iranian backed groups could launch a swarm of drones to simply exhaust the patriot/iron dome batteries stationed in the north prior to launching unguided rockets.

Again the psychological impact of this alone will be a “checkmate” for Iran in this affair.

Hezbollah and Hamas rockets are short range.

The hard is to keep accuracy in long range rockets (from Iran to Israel).

 

[RescueRanger]

Hezbollah and Hamas rockets are short range.

The hard is to keep accuracy in long range rockets (from Iran to Israel).

Agreed but as I said all they need to do is cause the Israelis to expend their complement of Patriot batteries and then launch the old 2002 style launch and pray rockets - it will have the desired effect.

 

[RescueRanger]

@BHAN85 I don’t think Iran has any intention or interest in directly targeting tel-aviv.